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Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: 
Restoring Legal Accountability 
 
 
 
Rise like lions after slumber 
In unvanquishable number 
Shake your chains to earth like dew 
which in sleep have fallen on you 
Ye are many – they are few. 
 
Shelley, The Mask of Anarchy  
 
 
 
The owners and directors of corporations must be made accountable in law for their 
actions.–Owner-shareholders and top executives exercise immense power in society both 
globally and locally, but are not responsible in law for their actions according to the law of 
limited liability. Giant corporations have the rights of a person, but none of the 
responsibilities. Corporations enthusiastically campaign to remove legal regulations that they 
say impede their businesses, just not the one they benefit from. Now corporations are 
pressing for society to become totally organised on corporate lines. This totalitarian 
momentum is solidifying the Tyranny of the Unaccountable Few as the new world order of 
the twenty first century.  
 
Society needs successful businesses, but today business is taking over society. It is as if an 
over-indulged child had taken more and more liberties until it is entirely out of control. 
Everyone wants the child to do well, no boundaries are set, and before you know it the 
family is under the thumb of a teenager gone wild.  
Box 1: The Rise of Corporate Power 
 
♦ 51 of the world’s 100 largest economies are corporations (Institute for Policy Studies, 
Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power, 2001). 
♦ 80% of the world’s industrial output is made by 1,000 corporations (The Economist, 29 
January 2000). 
♦ The combined sales of the top 200 corporations are bigger than the combined economies 
of all countries minus the ten largest (Institute for Policy Studies, Top 200: The Rise of 
Corporate Global Power, 2001). 
♦ Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) by collective investment funds have risen 
from $ 4.6 billion in 1987 to $ 134.6 billion in 2005 (World Investment Report 2006) 
♦ In the US, the share of wages in gross domestic product (GDP) is the lowest on record 
(45.3%). The share of corporate profits is the highest since the 1960s. (New York Times, 
28 August 2006). 
♦ In Europe, “beginning in the early 1980s, there was a remarkable distributional shift to 
profits. The wage share in Europe began to fall, and may not yet have stopped falling. By 
now the wage share on the Continent is substantially lower than in North America.” 
(Robert Solow, Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics, 1998). 
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Ironically it is the unfettered rise of corporate power (see box 1) that is the biggest threat 
to free markets, and the ability of free markets to promote individual freedom, equality 
before the law and equitable prosperity. Limited Liability is at the heart of this rise: a blanket 
exemption of a special interest group – owner-shareholders – from accountability for the 
actions of their companies. While the mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ is used to 
regulate the behaviour of poor people who benefit from social security payments – from 
single mothers to the unemployed, from the homeless to the ‘self-inflicted’ sick–, ‘The 
Unaccountable Few’ enjoy feudal privileges. 
 
It is, by no means, an exaggeration to note that owner-shareholders (and by extension 
manager-directors) are beyond the law to an extent not enjoyed by the Central Committees 
of Communist Parties, similar to the despotic monarchies, dictators and tribal leaders over 
which liberal Western societies claim moral supremacy and akin to the aristocracy in the 
Ancien Regimes of pre-enlightenment Europe . 
Box 2: What does limited liability mean?  
 
Most businesses are organised as companies with a legal structure in which the 
shareholders hold limited liability. This means that if the company fails or causes 
damage, the shareholders only lose the sum of money they invested. The company is 
designed to provide them with money, while protecting them from the responsibility 
for their actions or inactions in relation to it. A company can be prosecuted or sued if it 
sells defective products, destroys the environment or sells weapons to the enemy, but 
its shareholders are immune. The property rights of those damaged by companies have 
been removed to the benefit of a select group of property owners. This is at its clearest 
when creditors and employees can be made destitute if a corporation shuts down. 
Shareholders have regulated protection, at a time when other regulation is being swept 
away in their favour. Company directors also escape personal liability, seemingly 
because they are agents of shareholders, who are not liable. Nowadays, directors seem 
to exist in a privileged twilight zone beyond the reach of shareholders and public alike. 
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As with any rule by unlimited powers (or limited liabilities), the results are disastrous: since 
the end of mixed economies and after decades of corporate reign, despite the enormous 
wealth in society, there is a sense of corruption, increased inequalities and social tension, of 
declining life expectancy and health in the new ‘under-classes’ around the world and 
especially in the ex-communist world, of pending environmental disasters, of insecurity, war 
and terrorism.  
 
It is no accident that the Western leaders in the victory in the Second World War, Winston 
Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, made social security and labour rights key objectives for 
the post war world and that greater instability has followed their marginalisation. Today, the 
many who were to be freed from the yoke of state bureaucracies through the liberalisation 
of markets are the victims of businesses’ powers to raise the prices of essential goods – 
transport, electricity, water, to name but a few -, and the many who were to escape basic 
poverty have instead been joined by a growing ‘reserve army of the destitute’. Social 
protections are all too often regarded as impediments to free markets. 
 
Shareholder primacy in corporate affairs has been controversial, in particular in the wake of 
spectacular corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, but more broadly in 
response to the negative impact of unfettered corporate power on the growth prospects of 
many developing economies, on the natural environment and on mass social welfare in 
advanced economies.  
 
So far, the main plank of opposition to corporate power has been the promotion of 
voluntary reforms directed at an enhanced ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) of large 
corporations (Kotler and Lee 2005, Vogel 2005, www.csr.gov.uk). The core remedies to the 
control of corporate power are, first, calls on corporate decision-makers to adopt a practice 
of ‘good corporate governance’ aimed at fairness, transparency and accountability, and 
secondly, the idea of increasing the power of owner-shareholders to control management. 
 
But self-regulation and appeals to corporate social responsibility are not fit for the purpose 
of delivering responsible corporate behaviour. This is not surprising: The inherent vagueness 
of the ‘good corporate governance’ concept (see below) has made it easy for business to 
turn it from a rallying cry to curb its powers into a convenient marketing tool. But more 
importantly: The call for increased powers for owner-shareholders, presumably as a means 
to make large corporations more accountable for the social consequences of their activities, 
completely ignores a central device on which corporate power is built, namely limited 
liability: Limited Liability explicitly prevents owner-shareholders from having any legal right 
except to insist on the maximisation of returns. They cannot be the main drivers of ensuring 
responsible behaviour? Limited liability establishes a unique legal case for the separation of 
ownership rights from obligations for a select special interest group. It makes no sense at all to rely 
on those without legal responsibilities for the behaviour of corporations to reign in the irresponsible 
actions of those same corporations. 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Rights without responsibilities’: How did we get there?  
 
The arbitrary exemption from equality of all before the law of owners-shareholders is not 
only questionable on ethical grounds. It has also been instrumental in making corporations 
powerful, in the first place, by de facto or de jure abolishing social control over them, and in 
so doing has undermined the case for free markets and for the compatibility of capitalism 
with transparency and democracy. How, exactly, did this happen? 
 
On 18 February 2007, J. Bradford DeLong, Professor of Economics at the University of 
California at Berkeley, US, and one of the best-known US economists, posted a list of ten 
changes to US law over the past 225 years that, he argues, were initiated by judges without 
any lead from legislators. Fourth on this list is 
 
“[t]he post-Civil War empowering of corporations with exorbitant 
privileges of citizenship and limited liability at the expense of government 
regulators and creditors.” 
(http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2007/02/all_ten_of_the_.html). 
 
Box 3 : Corporate Social Responsibility is not fit for purpose. 
 
♦ The report Why Corporate Social Responsibility is Failing Children, published 
on 26 March 2007 by Save the Children and the Corporate Responsibility 
Coalition (CORE) states: 
 
“Without clearer signposts from government, companies will continue to 
think about the bottom line before their social and environmental impact. We 
know that children around the world could be saved if companies were more 
accountable for their actions... It is time both companies and governments got 
their priorities right.” 
 
♦ Today only 4-5 % of the 70,000 multinational companies that exist globally, 
according to UN data, have signed Corporate Social Responsibility Agreements. 
These are not legally binding. 
 
♦ “The image of companies working hard to make the world a better place is 
too often just that – a carefully manufactured image,” – says ‘Behind the 
Mask: The Real Face of Corporate Social Responsibility’, a 2004 report 
from Christian Aid. As the case studies in this report – featuring Shell, 
British American Tobacco and Coca-Cola – demonstrate, the rhetoric can 
also mask corporate activity that makes things worse for the communities in 
which they work.  
 
“Some of those shouting the loudest about their corporate virtues are also 
among those inflicting continuing damage on communities where they work 
– particularly poor communities,’ says Andrew Pendleton, senior policy 
officer at Christian Aid and author of the report. ‘Legally binding regulation 
is now needed to lessen the devastating impact that companies can have in an 
ever-more globalised world.” 
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This neatly highlights two core issues: First, the tale of the ‘empowering of corporations with 
exorbitant privileges’ unfolded in the second half of the 19th century, led by the US and 
Britain. By then, industrialisation had long been under way in the two leader countries, 
propelled and promoted, amongst others, by businesses and entrepreneurs not, as yet, 
invested with those privileges. Second, the tale comprises two essential chapters - the 
creation of the legal fiction of a ‘corporate person’ with rights, and the blanket exemption of 
this fictitious person from its responsibilities through limited liability.  
 
How corporations came to be persons...... 
 
The predecessors of modern corporations were commercial organisations, such as medieval 
guilds and the joint-stock companies of the 16th and 17th centuries, that were granted a 
monopoly or trading privileges for specific sectors or regions by the state. Early joint-stock 
companies, in particular, were an arm of the state, risking criminal prosecution for violating 
or contravening the national interest, as perceived by the royal authorities. Probably the 
best-known examples of such colonial companies are the Hudson’s Bay Company, the East 
India Company and the Royal Africa Company.  
It was not until 1886, that the US Supreme Court, finding on a dispute about railroad 
taxation, decided that private corporations are natural persons under the US constitution 
with all the rights and protection granted to human beings by the Bill of Rights. This decision 
invoked the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 to protect the rights of freed slaves, in effect 
extending the legal recognition of freed slaves as free human beings to private corporations. 
Remarkably, what today is the perhaps most important cornerstone of US corporate law – 
the doctrine of corporate personhood – was simply announced by Court Justice Morrison 
Remick Waite as a matter of opinion without discussion or legal validity: 
 
“The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the 
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids 
a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it 
does.” 
(US Supreme Court, Santa Clara County v Southern Pac.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) 
http://www.ratical.org/corporations/SCvSPR1886.html).  
 
Subsequently, US corporations successfully used their thus won human right to lobby the 
legislature, not only to extend the human rights to free speech and to privacy to 
corporations, but also to exempt corporations from any duty to public goods provision, and 
to grant corporations additional – ‘non-human’- rights, such as perpetual existence and the 
right to own others of their own kind (e.g. Bakan 2005, Nace 2003, Korten 1995, 1999, 
Hartmann 2004, Berk 1994).  
 
Whilst the “Corporate Bill of Rights” has remained a US particularity, the concept of 
corporations as distinct ‘persons’ with their own personality, separate and independent of its 
founders, investors, directors and managers, has become a standard element of 
incorporation. In the UK, the transformation of corporations from privileged monopolies, 
brought into existence by a grant or charter of the monarch or state, into a ‘person’ and a 
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legal entity of its own was also finalised through case law, rather than legislation by 
parliament. On 16 November 1896, the House of Lords issued a ruling in the case of 
Salomon vs. Salomon &Co. (1897, A.C. 22 H.L.) that was to become famous as the ‘Salomon 
principle’:  
 
Mr Salomon, a boot manufacturer, had sold his business to a new corporation, Salomon & 
Co., owned by seven shareholders (then the minimum legal requirement): his five children, 
his wife and himself. His wife and children each obtained one share in the company, while Mr 
Salomon retained the remaining 20,001 shares, also assuming the position of managing 
director of the new company, whose two directors were two of his sons. Since, as the sole 
proprietor of the original business, he had sold this to the new corporation for cash as well 
as debentures, Mr Salomon was simultaneously the managing director, main owner-
shareholder as well as creditor of Salomon & Co. When the company went into liquidation, 
the liquidators, treating Mr Salomon as the owner, demanded payment of his creditors. Mr 
Salomon, claiming his status as shareholder and holder of debentures against the company, 
argued that he should be paid rather than pay.  
 
The trial judge sided with the liquidators against the shareholders, as did the court of appeal, 
on the grounds that Salomon & Co. had been formed for fraudulent purposes and 
constituted an abuse of the privileges of incorporation and limited liability. The House of 
Lords overturned these decisions, arguing that the Companies Act of 1862 (see below) had 
created companies as legal persons separate and distinct from the shareholders without 
specifying, in any way, a requirement for independence between shareholders or a 
‘disinterested’ approach by shareholders to the company’s management. It was not the role 
of judges to impose limitations where these had not been imposed by parliament. 
 
Lord Macnaghten, one of the three Law lords in charge of the case, noted: “For such a 
catastrophe as has occurred in this case some would blame the law that allows the creation 
of a floating charge1. But a floating charge is too convenient a form of security to be lightly 
abolished. I have long thought, and I believe some of our Lordships also think, that the 
ordinary trade creditors of a trading company ought to have a preferential claim on the 
assets in liquidation in respect of debts incurred within a certain limited time before the 
winding-up. But that is not the law at present. Everybody knows that when there is a 
winding-up debenture-holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal 
it is.”(quoted at: http://www.swarb.co.uk/lisc/Cmpny18491899.php) Thus, despite misgivings 
about the ‘catastrophe’ caused in this case, the rights of the artificial ‘corporate person’ 
prevailed over those of the ‘ordinary trade creditors’ (e.g. Villalta Puig 2000). 
 
...... without responsibilities 
 
Even if the ruling in Salomon vs Salomon & Co. made legal history for firmly establishing the 
principle of the ‘corporate person’ as a an independent legal entity in the UK, the 
importance of the case derives from another attribute of separate legal personality – limited 
                                                 
1
 A floating charge is a transferable form of security under which business assets are used as security 
for loans. 
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liability. It is one thing to separate the legal existence of a body corporate from the physical 
existence of individuals. It is quite another thing to endow this body corporate with a 
blanket exemption from legal accountability. Mr Salomon had provided a perfect 
demonstration of the ease with which the special interest protection of shareholder-owners 
under limited liability is not only open to outrageous abuse, but actively encourages it – only 
to see this abuse sanctioned by the highest judges in the country.  
 
The economist Adam Smith was one of the first to identify the problems of limited liability 
companies, or joint-stock companies, as they were originally called. Against a background of 
escalating market speculation and crashes following on from investment scams, that led to 
the 1719 Bubble Act – declaring common law companies with transferable shares a 
‘common nuisance’ - Smith considered limited-liability companies in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776):  
 
“Joint stock companies, established either by royal charter or by act of 
parliament, differ in several respects, not only from regulated companies, 
but from private copartneries. 
First, in a private copartnery, no partner, without the consent of the 
company, can transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new 
member into the company. Each member, however, may, upon proper 
warning, withdraw from the copartnery, and demand payment from them of 
his share of the common stock. In a joint stock company, on the contrary, 
no member can demand payment of his share from the company; but each 
person can, without their consent, transfer his share to another person, and 
thereby introduce a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is 
always the price which it will bring in the market; and this may be either 
greater or less, in any proportion, than the sum which its owner stands 
credited for in the stock of the company. 
Secondly, in a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the debts 
contracted by the company to the whole extent of his fortune. In a joint 
stock company, on the contrary, each partner is bound only to the extent of 
his share. 
The Trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of 
directors. The court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the 
control of a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of those 
proprietors seldom pretend to understand anything of the business of the 
company; and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them, 
give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half yearly 
or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to them. This total 
exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages 
many people to become adventurers in joint stock companies, who would, 
upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery ... The 
directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a 
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rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their 
master’s honour, and very easily give themselves dispensation from having it. 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in 
the management of the affairs of such a company.  
[...] 
To establish a joint stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely 
because such a company might be capable of managing it successfully; or to 
exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws 
which take place with regard to all their neighbours, merely 
because they might be capable of thriving if they had such an 
exemption, would certainly not be reasonable. To render such an 
establishment perfectly reasonable ... it ought to appear with the clearest 
evidence that the undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the 
greater part of common trades. ... The joint stock companies, which are 
established for the public-spirited purpose of promoting some particular 
manufacture, over and above managing their own affairs ill, to the 
diminution of the general stock of the society, can in other respects scarce 
ever fail to do more harm than good. Notwithstanding the most upright 
intentions, the unavoidable partiality of their directors to particular 
branches of the manufacture, of which the undertakers mislead and impose 
upon them, is a real discouragement to the rest, and necessarily breaks, 
more or less, that natural proportion which would otherwise establish itself 
between judicious industry and profit, and which, to the general industry of 
the country, is of all encouragements the greatest and the most effectual.”  
(Smith 1776 [1981]: Book V, Pt III, Art 1, para.15-18, 36: 740-741, 757, emphasis 
added). 
 
Smith’s concerns – carefully omitted from the praise heaped on him by free-marketeers with 
no worries about corporate power – were shared, to varying degrees, by other eminent 
economists of the 19th century, including John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall.  
Nor was there any shortage of strong and sometimes colourful criticisms of the concept of 
limited liability outside the professional community of economists. The Tory Prime Minister 
Robert Peel, Britain’s richest industrialist in the 1820s, was also an uncompromising 
campaigner against limited liability, on grounds similar to J.S. Mill’s and A. Marshall’s concerns 
about the managerial limitations of joint-stock companies. Anthony Trollope’s The Way We 
Live Now (1873) stands as an elegant and harrowing portrayal of corporate fraud, brought on 
by limited liability in combination with insufficient financial disclosure. But perhaps the most 
damning and biting indictment of limited liability was produced by Gilbert and Sullivan who, 
in 1893, dedicated a whole opera to the topic – Utopia Ltd. (see box 4)... 
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Box 4: Gilbert and Sullivan, Utopia Ltd or The 
Flowers of Progress, 1893 
King.  A Company Limited?  What may that be? 
The term, I rather think, is new to me. 
Chorus.  A Company Limited? 
What may that be? 
Sca., Phan., & Tarara. What does he mean?  What does he mean? 
Give us a kind of clue! 
What does he mean?  What does he mean? 
What is he going to do? 
SONG  -  Mr. Goldbury. 
  Some seven men form an Association, 
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets) 
They start off with a public declaration 
To what extent they mean to pay their debts. 
That's called their Capital: if they are wary 
They will not quote it at a sum immense. 
The figure's immaterial - it may vary 
From eighteen million down to eighteenpence. 
  I should put it rather low; 
The good sense of doing so 
Will be evident to any debtor. 
When it's left to you to say 
What amount you mean to pay, 
Why, the lower you can put it at, the better. 
Chorus.  When it's left to you to say 
What amount you mean to pay, 
Why, the lower you can put it at, the better. 
Mr. Gold.  They then proceed to trade with all who'll trust 'em, 
Quite irrespective of their capital 
(It's shady, but it's sanctified by custom); 
Bank, Railway, Loan, or Panama Canal. 
You can't embark on trading too tremendous - 
It's strictly fair, and based on common sense - 
If you succeed, your profits are stupendous - 
And if you fail, pop goes your eighteenpence. 
Make the money-spinner spin! 
For you only stand to win, 
And you'll never with dishonesty be twitted. 
For nobody can know, 
To a million or so, 
To what extent your capital's committed! 
Chorus.  No, nobody can know, 
To a million or so, 
To what extent your capital's committed! 
Mr. Gold.  If you come to grief and creditors are craving. 
(For nothing that is planned by mortal head 
Is certain in this Vale of Sorrow - saving 
That one's Liability is Limited) - 
Do you suppose that signifies perdition? 
If so you're but a monetary dunce - 
You merely file a Winding-Up Petition, 
And start another Company at once! 
Though a Rothschild you may be 
In your own capacity, 
As a Company you've come to utter sorrow - 
But the Liquidators say, 
"Never mind - you needn't pay," 
So you start another Company tomorrow! 
Chorus.  But the Liquidators say, 
"Never mind - you needn't pay," 
So you start another Company tomorrow! [...] 
King.  Well, at first sight it strikes us as dishonest, 
But if it's good enough for virtuous England - 
The first commercial country in the world - 
It's good enough for us. 
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Initially, some of these concerns, criticisms and outright condemnations – in particular fears 
of encouraging excessive speculation, rendering credit provision more difficult and 
promoting fraudulent investment schemes – had some impact on company legislation, at 
least in Western Europe. In Britain, the 1844 Company Act still emphasised unlimited 
liability through the requirement for registered companies to publicize their members 
(Shannon 1931, Carney 1999). It was not until the mid 1850s, after prolonged debate, 
including a lengthy 1839 Report on the Law of Partnership prepared by H. Bellenden Ker at 
the direction of the Board of Trade and the 1851 Report from the Select Committee on the 
Law of Partnership, prepared at the direction of the House of Commons, that limited liability 
won the day, enshrined, finally and fully, in the Companies Act of 1862, to which the 
Salomon vs Salomon & Co. ruling referred. 
 
In 1866, a financial crisis hit London whose seriousness was largely attributed to the 
mushrooming of limited liability companies after 1862. This led to the establishment of a 
Select Committee of the House Commons to investigate the impact of limited liability in 
1867. While the Select Committee refused to question or reform the new principle of 
limited liability, public opinion was much more critical: The following suggestion by the 
conservative paper Judy, quoted in Taylor (2006: ch.5) was representative of the public 
mood: 
 
“From the public’s experience of the Court of Bankruptcy for the last 
twelve months, it is suggested that in future limited liability companies be 
designated as Unlimited Lie-Ability Companies” (30 October 1869) 
 
Perhaps in part because of this experience, only around 10 percent of important British 
firms had taken advantage of incorporation with limited liability by 1885 (Carney 1999: 663), 
and by 1900 fewer than 100,000 UK Ltd companies had been formed. By contrast, the 20th 
century saw a proliferation of limited liability companies, in particular since the 1980s, with 
now more than 2 million such companies registered at Companies House in Cardiff (Martin 
2006: 1). Other Western European countries, notably Germany and France, relied to a still 
lesser extent on joint-stock companies – the shareholder model. In Germany, the 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) (limited liability company) was not 
introduced until 1892, once again amongst much debate and opposition despite its much 
more stringent regulation in terms of minimum founding capital, the establishment of a 
supervisory board for GmbHs with more than 500 employees and potential liability of 
managing directors in violation of detailed duties. This more restricted form of limited 
liability was adopted in Austria and Eastern Europe in the early years of the 20th century, but 
did not become established in France until 1925. Similarly, more recent outstanding success 
cases of catching-up industrialisation, such as Japan and South Korea, did not make stock 
markets a major plank of their industrialisation strategies. 
 
In the US, limited liability spread earlier and more rapidly, mainly due to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ competition between states to attract investors. By 1830, limited liability was the 
general rule (Carney 1999: 664), with some notable exceptions: California did not introduce 
limited liability until 1931, instead imposing pro-rata unlimited shareholder liability. This 
means that in addition to risking their investment, shareholders were responsible for the 
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debts of the company in proportion to the amount of the company they owned. Weinstein 
(2000) argues that this deviation from the norm in the US did not have any discernable 
effects on the stock market price of companies’ shares, although at that time 
Californians had not developed the art of suing corporations, still less their 
shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A law imposed in six US states at different points in time and surviving to the day in 
New York and Wisconsin, imposes shareholder liability for unpaid wages (Carney 
1999: 664). Finally, between 1865 and 1932, federal as well as state law routinely 
imposed double and even triple liability on the shareholders of banks. This meant 
that shareholders’ liability would amount to two or three times the face value of the 
shares they owned. The face value is the value of the shares when they were sold to the 
public. For example, a company might offer 1,000,000 $1 shares for sale on the stock 
market, they might then be traded at a value of 10c or $10, but the liability would be based 
on the issued share price of $1, and could be $2 or $3. After a short flirtation with limited 
liability for banking shareholders after the Great Depression of 1929 – 1932, this was again 
Box 5: Timeline- Limited Liability (LL) for the ‘Corporate 
Person’ 
 
1816-1849: Different forms of LL for corporations introduced in most US states 
1844: Companies Act,  UK, still emphasises unlimited liability 
1855 - 58: Introduction of LL for UK companies 
1862: Companies Act: Extends LL to all companies of seven or more members with 
virtually no other conditions attached. 
 
1866/67: Financial crisis in UK attributed to LL and irresponsible company 
foundations, leads to 1867 Select Committee on investigation into LL. 
 
1886: Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co 118 U.S.  394: US corporations 
elevated to persons under the law with the same rights as human beings. 
 
1897: Salomon v. Salomon AC 22 (H.L.) : “The company is at law a different person 
altogether from the [shareholders]..., and, though it may be that after incorporation the 
business is precisely the same as before, and the same persons are managers, and the 
same hands receive the profits, and the company is not in law the agent of the 
[shareholders] or trustee for them. Nor are the [shareholders], as members, liable in any 
shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided for by the Act 
[Companies Act of 1862].” 
 
1892: Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) introduced in Germany, 
gradually adopted in Austria, Eastern Europe, France in the first half of the 20th 
century. 
 
1931: LL introduced for the first time in California, US. 
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“replaced with Federal deposit insurance and comprehensive monitoring of bank solvency by 
regulators” (Carney 1999: 664).  
 
This brief look at the history of corporate law reveals a couple of interesting points: First, 
the legal foundations of the rise of corporate power – the Tyranny of the Unaccountable 
Few – had nothing to do with the economic dynamism of early industrialisation. These legal 
foundations – the fictitious legal creation of the ‘corporate person’ without responsibilities – 
only took hold in the lead economies of the 19th century when industrialisation had long 
been under way. The Economist’s leader for its Millenium issue (23 December 1999) - “The 
key to industrial capitalism: limited liability. The modern world is built on two centuries of 
industrialisation. Much of that was built by equity finance. Which is built on limited liability” is a 
fact-free statement used to legitimate today’s inequalities, and rather cavalier about the 
Economist’s own historic stance against limited liability on the grounds, that “if limited liability 
was desirable [...] market forces would provide it.” (ibid.). This leads straight to the second 
observation: Limited liability was not provided by market forces, as the Economist recognises: 
“But by 1926, this paper had been converted [to limited liability], suggesting that the 
nameless inventor of the concept might earn ‘a place of honour with Watt, Stephenson and 
other pioneers of the industrial revolution” (ibid). Neither, however, was it invented by a 
‘nameless inventor’ deserving of some Nobel Prize: It was gradually pushed and shoved up 
the legislative ladder by a conjunction of business lobbying, the contingent and situational 
initiatives of judges, and political debate, in general. As Berk (1994) argues in great and 
fascinating detail for the emergence of the doctrine of the corporation as a natural entity in 
the US, fending off the challenges of creditors in receivership, this was driven neither by 
technical necessity, not by the exercise of brute power, but by “historically contingent, not 
economically necessary, reasons” (ibid.: 51). The winners – from large US railroad 
companies to Mr Salomon – won their victories, not because they represented market 
forces or because of their inventive genius, but because some judges somewhere, and some 
members of parliament constituting a Select Committee at the time, happened to come 
down on their side of the argument, reflecting emerging balances of power. 
 
Yet, today limited liability for the ‘corporate person’ has been elevated to the status of a 
‘natural law’ or a religious dogma: To question its validity and legitimacy is to provoke 
instant scorn, ridicule or disbelief, rather than argument. Dogma is the enemy of 
accountability and a typical attribute of any tyranny. The concerns about limited liability 
raised in the 19th century debate remain valid – not only have they not been refuted by 
argument, but they have been confirmed by reality. 
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Three reasons why unequal protection through limited 
liability is harmful 
 
Limited liability violates the equality of all before the law in favour 
of the Unaccountable Few 
 
Adam Smith’s main objection to joint-stock companies with limited liability is also the most 
profound: A society should not exempt some people from general laws simply because their 
business may thrive as a result.  
 
Box 6: The Northwick Park Six, TeGenero and Paraxel 
 
In March 2006, six volunteers in a drug trial came close to death. All have suffered 
lasting disastrous effects on their health and medical experts have concluded that their 
life expectancy has been reduced.  
 
The drug, TGN1412, had been manufactured by Boehringer Ingelsheim GmbH for 
Germany-based TeGenero to treat leukemia and rheumatoid arthritis. TeGenero had 
hired the US company Parexel to carry out the trial. Before the trial, TeGenero 
executives had agreed to compensate the volunteers in the event of an injury to comply 
with the guidelines of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI).  
 
When disaster struck, TeGenero filed for insolvency three months later. It had 
insurance coverage of only £2 million for all six volunteers together despite much 
higher sums per case being standard in the industry. The very insufficient liability 
coverage also has a further drawback: Written by the Gerling Group the coverage 
contains a clause that voids the insurance in the case of any legal proceedings being 
brought. 
 
Parexel’s literature shows that, before the start of the trial, the possibility of a violent – 
cytokine – shock to the immune system, was known. It also suggests a remedy, a 
certain steroid. Parexel staff at the trial was unaware of this literature, and the steroid 
was not available in sufficient amounts.  The Medical and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) also criticised Paraxel for a series of errors. Yet, Parexel 
does not seem to be legally liable. 
 
To-date, the volunteers have only received a nominal interim payment of £10.000 each. 
In the case of having received similar, or lesser or any injuries at the hands of the NHS, 
rather than those of TeGenero and Parexel, the volunteers could have sued for full 
liability immediately. 
 
(http://www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/page.pl?pageId=387, Simon 
Hattenstone in Guardian 17 February 2007, 
http://www.irwinmitchell.com/PressOffice/PressReleases/northwick-park-
trial.htm) 
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As mentioned, Smith’s condemnation of limited liability, and thus of the legal structure of 
most modern businesses, is omitted from the way his views are handed down by free-
market advocates. Britain’s Adam Smith Institute is a bastion of corporate rights. Fans of 
globalisation such as Philippe Legrain find it useful to cite Smith’s wisdom in support of their 
arguments, but omit his critique of the structure of modern capitalism.  
 
Smith’s concerns over limited liability are discussed by John Micklethwait and Adrian 
Wooldridge in their recent hymn to corporations, The Company: A Short History of a 
Revolutionary Idea. They state that Smith had two objections to limited liability: that such 
companies were inefficient and tended in his day to be monopolies, implying that somehow 
these objections are not relevant to present-day capitalism. But most importantly, 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge fail to consider Smith’s main objection, namely that society 
should not exempt some people from general laws simply because they may thrive as a 
result. 
 
This basic objection is all the more important since the people exempted from general law 
under limited liability are not just any interest group: They are the rich and those who trust 
the rich with their money, or see no alternative but to do so, such as for example, many 
modern day shareholders in private pension funds. Limited liability is unequal protection for 
the powerful (and their sources of finance). While, in an egalitarian and just society, it may 
make sense to grant protection to specific groups, on the grounds that their members are, 
for one reason or another, systematically disadvantaged or disempowered for no fault of 
their own, there can be no ethical justification for the unequal protection of the powerful: 
 
“[W]e are all aware that we live not only in a corporate society but a 
society of large corporations. The management-that is, the control-of these 
corporations is in the hands, at most, of a few thousand men. Who selected 
these men, if not to rule over us, at least to exercise vast authority, and to 
whom are they responsible? The answer to the first question is quite clearly: 
they selected themselves. The answer to the second is, at best, nebulous. 
This, in a nutshell, constitutes the problem of legitimacy.” 
(Mason, The Corporation in Modern Society 1959 quoted in: Forouhar 
2006:5) 
 
That the answer to the second question is nebulous, is down to limited liability: By 
exempting owner-shareholders from any basic responsibility for the consequences of a 
corporation’s decisions and actions, it is not only essential to the creation of the vast power 
they have been able to amass through access to finance and largely uncontrolled 
appropriation of wealth, in the first place. It then also provides giant actors, invested with 
such immense power, with further exemption from accountability to the rest of society.  
 
Smith’s fundamental objection to limited liability as a violation of the equality of all before the 
law is even more poignant, when we consider a legal development Smith could not have 
foreseen: The treatment of corporations as ‘persons’ before the law. So, on the one hand, 
we say that, before the law, corporations are just another person, and, in the case of US 
companies in particular, should have all the rights granted to human beings. This was the 
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reasoning behind the decision of the US Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti (435 U.S. 765, 784) in 1978 to grant the right to free speech to corporations: Free 
speech should not lose its protection because its source is a corporation. This in flagrant 
disregard of another important principle, emphasised the US Supreme Court some 30 years 
earlier in Kovaks v Cooper (336 U.S. 77 (1949), namely that the right to free speech does not 
include the right to “drown out” someone else’s speech. No-one doubts that, to-day, 
corporate wealth and influence very much “drowns out” the voice of ordinary persons. 
(Forouhar 2006). Today’s important corporations may not be the chartered monopolies of 
Smith’s times, but they are giant, beyond Smith’s imagination. On the other hand, we say that 
these ‘corporate persons’, with access to the same rights as everyone else, should also have 
special and wide-reaching protection of exemption for accountability for the consequences 
of their actions, not accorded to anyone else in society. 
 
If equality before the law is to have any meaning, it must apply to human beings, not fictitious 
persons, and organisations – as opposed to persons – must not be handed blanket 
exemptions from accountability simply on the grounds that they can thrive through privilege. 
We cannot, on the one hand, treat corporations as if they were just any person, and on the 
other, invest them with unequal protection. Otherwise, we are guilty of a double blindness 
to power: We disregard it by setting human beings equal to powerful corporations before 
the law. And we disregard it again by granting special interest protection to the powerful 
through limited liability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 7: Adam Smith on ‘the interest of dealers’ 
 
“To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of 
the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable to the interest of 
the public; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can 
serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what they 
naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax on the rest of 
their fellow citizens. The proposal of any new law or regulation of 
commerce which comes from this order ought always to be listened to with 
great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long 
and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the 
most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men whose interest is 
never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an 
interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly 
have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.” 
 
(The Wealth of Nations 1776 [1981], Vol. I, Book I, Part III, I.xi.p., para. 10: 267) 
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Limited liability promotes speculation and corruption, not 
economic growth and innovation 
 
Apart from these fundamental considerations in the interest of equality and the proper 
recognition of the need to govern power, rather than to be governed by arbitrary power, 
the main concerns, expressed by contemporaries of the debates surrounding the gradual 
introduction of limited liability, referred to economic arguments: Limited liability, it was 
argued, was likely to facilitate sluggish management due to the separation of control from 
ownership, to encourage irresponsible risk-taking and speculation at the expense of society 
as a whole, and to deter creditors by making equity less risky at the expense of increasing 
the risk of debt. These were the most pressing issues, raised by J.S. Mill and A. Marshall, 
amongst others.  
 
By contrast, advocates of limited liability often argue that limited liability is an ingenious 
device to raise equity finance and thus to promote productivity growth that benefits 
everyone. This reasoning is wrong. Limited liability was not a pre-condition of 
industrialisation anywhere in the world at any time. In the lead-countries, notably the UK 
and the US, it was one of its outcomes, promoted – along different routes, but haphazardly, 
haltingly and reliant on many political and judicial contingencies – by already existing modern 
business interests (many of these very large) in negotiation with judicial and political systems 
and institutions that were, if not already dominated by these special interests, at least biased 
in their favour to some considerable extent. In follower-up countries, from Germany to 
Japan and South Korea, equity finance played a very minor role in the financing of 
industrialisation. Limited liability and the shareholder mentality have only gained real ground 
over the past three decades with the rise of global financial deregulation and neo-liberalism. 
 
But how important is equity finance encouraged by limited liability for economic growth in 
the twenty first century? The primacy of stock markets and speculative capital flows over the 
global economy since the early 1980s has seen a reduction of world growth rates from an 
annual average of 4.8% in 1960-1980 to 2.9% in 1980-2000 (World Bank, World Economic 
Indicators 2005) and a slow-down of the growth of labour productivity from an annual 
2.5% to 0.8% for the same periods, respectively (Bosworth and Collins 2003). In 
addition, income inequalities across the world have escalated (see box 8) 
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The millennium celebration of limited liability in the Economist conveniently overlooks all of 
this. Following Moss from the Harvard Business School, they argue that “the benefits of 
putting a ceiling on the potential losses faced by shareholders far outweighed the cost of a 
slightly higher risk of debt default”. Even so, there were ups and downs for equity finance: 
 
“The crash of 1929 made the public aware for the first time that, for all 
their merits, equities had serious flaws (as did Wall Street brokers, happy to 
sell their own portfolios before those of their clients). Unsurprisingly, 
confidence in equities recovered only slowly, and then thanks only to 
tougher regulation of Wall Street and gradual economic recovery. The Dow 
did not exceed its 1929 high until 1954. Even then, after a bull market in the 
1960s, between 1968 and 1982 the Dow lost three-quarters of its value in 
real terms; in August 1979 Business Week asked in its cover whether 
equities were dead.  
Box 8: The Liabilities of the Globalisation of the Shareholder-
Model since the 1980s 
 
♦ A near halving of the growth rates of world output from an annual average of 4.8% in 
1960-1980 to  2.9% in 1980-2000 (World Economic Indicators 2005) 
♦ A reduction of the growth rates of labour productivity from 2.5% to 0.8% for the 
same periods, respectively (Bosworth and Collins 2003). 
♦ A very pronounced increase in the ratio of GDP per capita of the richest to the 
poorest countries from 8.7 in1870 to 51.6 in 1985 (Pritchard 1995). 
♦ A sharp increase in the ratio of the richest 10% over the poorest 10% across 
countries, (data from UN Development Programme Reports and World Development 
Indicators, various years): 
 
 In 2004, the combined wealth of the three richest persons in the world exceeded the 
total GDP of the 48 poorest countries 
 In 1980, the 60 million people with the highest incomes received 216 times as much 
as the 60 million poorest. By 2003, this gap had risen to 564 times.  
 In 2003, the 10% richest US citizens receive a total income that equals that of the 
poorest 2.2 billion in the world 
 
♦ An unprecedented and explosive increase of speculative financial exchanges relative 
to the growth of trade in real goods and services (Eatwell and Taylor 2000): 
 
 More than 70 severe financial crises in developed and developing countries since 
1980. 
 1972 – 1992: World trade increases by $3,000 billion and gross international 
banking increases by $ 7,000 billion 
• 1973 -1995: Foreign exchange trading rises from between $10-20 billion per day to 
$1260 billion/day ($80 billion in 1980), ratio of foreign exchange trading to world 
trading rises from about 2/1 to 70/1 (10/1 in 1980). 
• 1970 – 1993: Sales and purchases of bonds and equities between foreigners and US 
residents rise from 3% of US GDP to 135% (9% in 1980); cross-border security 
transactions in the UK rise from almost nothing to more than 1000% of GDP. 
• 1985 – 1995: Foreign equity ownership (“capitalisation”) in ‘emerging markets’ rises 
from near to nothing to 13% of the world total; international bank lending rises from 
$265 billion in 1975 to $4.2 trillion in 1994. 
♦  
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Since then, however, with the notable exception of Japan, and a brief 
wobble in October 1987, shares in rich countries have mostly been a 
one-way bet, while countries that once shunned shareholder capitalism now 
have flourishing if volatile stock markets. The total value of share in listed 
companies worldwide is now some $ 28 trillion. [...] for shareholders 
over the past 20 years capital growth has more than amply justified the 
risk.”  
(Economist, 23 December 1999, emphasis added). 
 
No-one could make the point with more clarity: Ever since the rise of neoliberalism, market 
liberalisation and privatisation, shareholders are the winners (in their totality, not necessarily 
individually). But so what? This is only to be expected, when free reign is given to ‘corporate 
persons’ who operate under limited liability, i.e. without responsibility. Of course, they will 
profit. The real question is whether their profiting also advanced the economy as a whole. It 
didn’t – to the contrary (and to call developing countries stock markets ‘flourishing if 
volatile’ just two years after the Asian crisis of 1997 must be the overstatement of the year). 
 
In addition to the question of the economic and social usefulness of stock markets – a 
question answered with a resounding no by J.M. Keynes, of course – there is also the 
facilitation of corporate fraud through limited liability. Since the 1990s corporate scandals 
have hardly left the headlines, from the UK Guinness Affair, the collapse of the Bank for 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Robert Maxwell’s mishandling of the Mirror 
Group pension fund, Enron, World.com. and Parmalat, to name but a few. 
 
The concept of ‘piercing the veil’ describes some barely known circumstances in which 
under certain nation’s laws shareholders can be held liable for their actions. According to 
one British specialist discussing a case relating to claims for asbestos-related injuries that 
were thwarted by layers of Russian-doll-like limited-liability companies with one hiding inside 
another: 
Any modern consideration of lifting the corporate veil must almost certainly begin 
with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries [1991] 1 All 
ER 929. The case saw the most detailed judicial review of this aspect of company 
law ever undertaken in the UK. Justice Scott, and then the Court of Appeal, 
refused to allow the veil to be lifted on an English parent company whose 
American subsidiary had been successfully sued by American litigants but which 
had insufficient assets to satisfy judgement. Lord Justice Slade said: ‘Our law, for 
better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, which though in 
one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the 
general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and 
liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities.’ The law will not 
permit the lifting of the corporate veil just because the interests of justice would 
be better served by doing so. 
(Griffith 2003) 
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This specialist went on to say that the veil of incorporation may be lifted where a company is 
a sham and no third party has an involvement with it. It may also be lifted where the 
company is a party to a fraud. It will not be lifted just because justice demands it. A director 
can escape personal liability to a third party in negligence by acting through his company and 
ensuring that he is perceived as accepting no personal liability for what he is doing. He 
cannot escape personal liability where he acts fraudulently on behalf of his company. A 
similar legal protection exists in the US (Plesch 2004: 360 fn17). 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development recognises that limited liability 
shields the corrupt, especially when hidden behind the seven veils of subsidiary companies. The 
2001 OECD study ‘Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes’ 
concludes: 
Corporate entities – corporations, trusts, foundations and partnerships – are often 
misused for money laundering, bribery and corruption, shielding assets from creditors, 
tax evasion, self-dealing, market fraud and other illicit activities. The veil of secrecy 
they provide in some jurisdictions may also facilitate the flow of funds to terrorist 
organisations. 
 
‘Behind the Corporate Veil’ argues that the types of corporate entities that are most 
frequently misused are those that provide the greatest degree of anonymity to their 
beneficial owners. In response, the OECD calls on governments and other relevant 
authorities to ensure they are able to obtain information on the beneficial ownership and 
control of corporate entities and, where appropriate, to share this information with law 
enforcement authorities domestically and internationally. On 13 March 2007, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution, making similar recommendations. This resolution urges the 
European Commission to extend legal obligations to enhance corporate accountability, such 
as director’s duties, foreign direct liability, and environmental and social reporting. This 
entails a clear recognition of the failure of purely voluntary corporate social responsibility 
campaigns, and comes only a few months after the UK Companies Act 2006 that extends 
directors’ duties to the consideration of the impact of their business operations on the 
community and the environment, as well as strengthening reporting requirements for 
quoted UK companies to include environmental, social and community matters. 
 
However, and as should now be clear, it is the company – the ‘corporate person’ that gets 
sued. A limited-liability company can simply be the expendable fall guy that can be declared 
bankrupt or shut down while the shareholders are long gone. Companies have additional 
structures to protect themselves even further. This is through the creation of subsidiary 
companies. In this case the subsidiary may be sued but its parent company cannot because it 
is the shareholder. In this way a further incentive to irresponsible behaviour has been 
created. 
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Limited Liability enriches few but harms many 
 
Limited liability encourages fraudulent behaviour not only at the scale of Enron or 
World.com, it does so every day in small-scale business. Mr Salomon (and Mr Goldbury) 
stand for this kind of behaviour. The creditors, in the cases, are mostly not large banks but 
ordinary buyers who cannot sue a company for bad services or even failure to deliver 
services, when this company can simply shut down and re-open under another Ltd label.  
Box 9: Limited liability and multinational companies in 
developing countries 
 
A long list of large multinational companies, standing accused of gross abuses of 
human rights, labour rights, children’s rights and of the natural environment routinely 
hides behind the impenetrable wall of the complexities of limited group liability. In 
most cases, parent companies can walk away from disasters and abuses caused by their 
subsidiaries, even where the group’s management has been highly integrated. 
(Muchlinksi 1995, ch. 8). 
 
 
Bhopal has become a byword for disasters, similarly to Chernobyl. Because of the 
scale of the disaster, legal opinion regards Bhopal as a case of ‘the corporate veil’ 
having been ‘pierced’. But the 1989 settlement of $470 million paid to the Indian 
government is considered woefully inadequate by campaigners and the Indian Supreme 
Court. In the meanwhile, Union Carbide, the parent company of Union Carbide India, 
has been bought by Dow. They continue to refuse any legal or moral responsibilities 
for the Bhopal legacy (e.g. SustainAbility 2005) 
 
In most other cases, the corporate veil has not even been pierced: For example, Nestlé, 
the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Haliburton, Rimbunan Hijau, Monsanto, Afrimex 
and many large supermarket chains all continue to face accusations from local and 
international campaigners and, in some cases, from governments about human rights 
abuses, environmental degradation, violation of labour rights, bribery and tax evasion. 
For detailed documentation, see  
 
http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Individualcompanies 
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Box 10: The collapse of Farepak Ltd 
 
Farepak, a savings club encouraging people to save monthly for vouchers to spend at 
Christmas, collapsed in October 2006, depriving around 120,000 people, mostly on low 
incomes, of around £40 million savings. 
 
Farepak was owned by European Home Retail (EHR), formerly Kleeneze plc, a 
seemingly reputable and successful company that made £6m profits in 2005. But EHR 
had used the savings paid into Farepak by mostly low-income earners as a ‘piggybank’ 
for the acquisition of booksales firm DMG in 2000, later re-filling the Farepak 
accounts by taking out a loan from HBOS (Halifax and Bank of Scotland). 
 
DMG made high losses and was sold again for a near nominal sum. HBOS called in the 
debt by seizing the savings paid into Farepak. Even though shares in EHR had been 
suspended in August 2006, Farepak went on to accept money from its customers for 
several months. 
 
Not only was EHR’s use of Farepak as a ‘piggybank’ entirely legal – there is no 
requirement for Christmas Clubs to ring-fence the money they take in -, under limited 
liability, EHR and Farepak cannot be held accountable for their decisions.  
 
Meanwhile, the owners and directors have been enriched. Majority shareholder 
Nicholas Gilodi-Johnson received £62,000 a year , apart from his estimated share 
dividend of almost £445,000. Of the other Farepak directors at the time of the DMG 
disaster, Sir Clive Thompson, was paid an annual consultancy fee of £100,000 and 
chief executive William Rollason a £275,000 annual salary, their company pensions 
will be paid by the taxpayer under an insurance scheme. 
 
(BBC Business News 07 November 2006, www.thisismoney.co.uk/ 10 November 
2006, The Telegraph, 29 October 2006) 
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Professions such as law, accountancy and architecture have all operated as successful 
businesses for many years without the protection of limited liability. However, starting 
in the US, a new concept of limited liability has been introduced to allow these 
professionals to escape liability for their actions. When new laws were proposed in 
Britain to extend limited liability to the professions, Andrew Phillips made a vain 
attempt to at least force companies to advertise any previous names they had used to 
conduct business. In debate, the government minister makes a crack at Phillips’s own 
profession of law: 
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: ‘But was it not Adam Smith who also said that all professions were 
a conspiracy against the laity?’ 
 
Lord Phillips of Sudbury: ‘That is precisely why I have opposed this Bill stock, root and branch. I 
am a great admirer of my own profession. But I am afraid that this measure is apt to be a 
conspiracy against the public interest from start to finish. However, I am more concerned with 
the small traders who will take advantage of the special privileges of this Bill. Let us make no 
bones about it; this will provide your two-man cowboy building outfit with a uniquely flexible 
and light framed means of screwing the public, to put it in Anglo-Saxon terms ... One of my 
jobs is that of legal adviser on the Jimmy Young Show. Over 25 years I have heard of 
hundreds of thousands of cases of abuse in relation to small, local companies that get nowhere 
near the attention of the DTI and get nowhere near being addressed by the various provisions 
to which the Minister refers. It depresses me that in this House we are so far out of touch with 
public opinion, if I may put it this way, at the bottom end of the social spectrum. People are 
ripped off, day in, day out, by the easy availability of limited liability for off-the-
shelf companies and the protections provided for them, and with no real 
remedies.’ (House of Lords, 24 January 2004, emphasis added) 
 
If limited liability hits everyday consumers, day in, day out, large-scale speculation by 
irresponsible shareholders and their unaccountable managers is not only harmful to the 
economy as a whole (see box 8), as J. M. Keynes so stringently and clearly argued over 70 
years ago. What is often overlooked is that when speculation leads to financial crises and 
bankruptcies of limited liability companies, the losers are not only creditors, but first and 
foremost the employees. If, to this day, New York and Wisconsin impose shareholder 
liability for unpaid wages (Carney 1999: 664), they not only are the exception rather than 
the rule, but even this limitation of limited liability does nothing for those who loose their 
jobs because of irresponsible management behaviour, company direction and shareholder 
indifference.  
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Finally, one of the reasons most often given on behalf of business and shareholders for 
the continuation of limited liability is that anyone can freely choose to go into business 
or invest through buying shares. Millions of people own shares through their pension 
schemes or through investment companies that manage the money of many small 
investors. There is no doubt that this has benefited many millions of people, However, 
even in the US only one-half of all households participate in the stock market through 
pension plans, and of these households very few have more than a tiny proportion of 
the shares of any one company. As Lord Conrad Black, currently on trial in Chicago for 
allegedly stealing £30 millions from the shareholders of Hollinger International, made 
clear: Even larger shareholder’s concerns over boardroom excesses (in this case the 
investment firm Tweedy Brown) are dismissed as “sanctimony” and “hysteria” 
(Guardian, 23 March 2007), not to mention the concerns of small shareholders. 
 
It will be simple to, if necessary, make a cut-off point for liability for small shareholders 
– just so long as that does not provide a loophole for large institutional investors. In 
any case, the major corporations, institutions and the super-rich are the groups that 
own significant parts of major companies. As has been demonstrated in the studies by 
Professor Edward N. Wolff (1995) of New York University in 1989, ten per cent of US 
families owned eighty-nine per cent of stocks and bonds traded on the stock exchange. 
Since then these concentrations have increased. Similar concentrations of wealth 
protected by limited-liability laws now exist around the world. 
US families are classified into wealth class by Wolff on the basis of their net worth. In the 
top one per cent of the wealth distribution (the ‘Super Rich’) are families with a net worth 
Box 11: “Employees are a little further down the pecking order 
in private equity” (M. Gordon, chief investment officer, Fidelity) 
 
A BBC report on the rise of private equity corporations stated: “The GMB union has 
branded Permira, involved in the takeover of the AA, as "buccaneering asset-strippers".  
The current private equity boom – European private equity went up by over 40% in 
2006 alone – consists largely of so-called leveraged buyouts: Firms such as 
Debenhams, AA and Birds Eye are bought with huge loans with the sole purpose of 
selling them off again at a profit.  
One way of achieving these profits, is to cut jobs. The GMB union’s comments were 
prompted by more than a quarter of AA’s workforce getting the sack while under 
Permira's ownership, and by Michael Gordon’s remarks above. 
But an even bigger threat for jobs are the likely bankruptcies an over-heated private 
equity market inevitably produces: “If a company has too much debt, stops investing, 
runs itself to the point where it can’t even buy enough stock to run the business, then 
you have bankruptcies.” (Jon Moulton, Alchemy). 
With limited liability, the price for irresponsible investment behaviour to obtain ‘quick 
bucks’ is paid not by the owners and the decisionmakers, but by the employees. 
 
(BBC News report, 15 February 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6364673.stm) 
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of $2.35 million or more in 1989; in the next nine per cent (the ‘Rich’) are families with a net 
worth greater than or equal to $346,400 but less than $2.35 million; in the bottom ninety 
per cent (‘Everybody Else’) are families with a net worth less than $346,400: 
 
 Stocks Bonds 
Super Rich 46.2% 54.2% 
Rich 43.1% 34.3% 
Everybody Else 10.7% 11.5% 
 
Supporters of mass shareholding often make exaggerated claims that a few years down the 
road result in great disappointment. In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher’s government had TV 
advertising campaigns trying to persuade members of the public to buy shares in the newly 
privatised utilities. A few years later large corporations were buying out these small 
shareholders – few had ever bought more shares and the cost of providing them with 
information was very uneconomic for the privatised companies. During the stock market 
boom of the 1990s conservative politicians in the US and Britain began to campaign to 
privatise social-security holdings. This would have meant that this money was no longer held 
by the government bank but could be invested in companies. This idea was becoming 
fashionable until there was a sudden dramatic fall in the stock market, after which little more 
was heard of it. 
 
Yet, despite these drawbacks, legislation to extend limited liability is currently under way in 
many leading economies. This is the other side of legislation or high-level recommendations 
for more legal supervision of good corporate governance (such as the OECD guidelines, the 
EU resolution and the UK Companies Act 2006, see above). These moves to facilitate 
limited liability include a new company law in Japan (April 2006), in Germany (in draft 
proposal) and, crucially, the promotion and rapid proliferation of Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs) (see box 12)). The latter have been at the heart of recent corporate 
fraud, most notably as the business form chosen by Arthur Anderson and other accounting 
firms implicated in the Enron fiasco to shield its partners from liability (Mattera 2002). A 
similar hybrid company form in the US – CLLs (see box) – have become particularly popular 
in the energy and nuclear industry. A report prepared for Synapse Energy Economics by 
STAR Foundation Riverkeepers from August 2002 finds: 
 
“Over the last ten years, the ownership of an increasing number 
of nuclear plants has been transferred to a relatively small number 
of very large corporations. These large corporations have adopted 
business structures that create separate limited liability 
subsidiaries for each nuclear plant, and in a number of instances, 
separate operating and ownership entities that provide additional 
liability buffers between the nuclear plant and its ultimate owners. 
The limited liability structures being utilized are effective 
mechanisms for transferring profits to the parent/owner while 
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avoiding tax payments. They also provide a financial shield for the 
parent/owner if an accident, equipment failure, safety upgrade, or 
unusual maintenance need at one particular plant creates a large, 
unanticipated cost. The parent/owner can walk away, by declaring 
bankruptcy for that separate unit, without jeopardizing its other 
nuclear and non-nuclear investments.” (p. 2, see also box 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Box 12: LL made easy – current developments 
 
 
Japan (April 2006): New Company law that integrates ‘limited liability companies’ 
into ‘stock companies’. A ‘stock company’ with limited liability can be formed with 
one board member; there are no more minimum capital requirements or other trade 
name regulations. (http://jetro.go.jp/uae/topics/2006021808-topics) 
 
Germany (2nd draft proposal 2007): New limited liability company law expected to 
become law in 2007 facilitates the formation of GmbHs by reducing the statutory 
minimum capital (only 5000 Euros must actually be raised), abolishing the requirement 
for the sole shareholder of a single shareholder GmbH to provide security for any 
amount of registered capital not paid up, and allowing the GmbH to be founded before 
approval of its objective by a public authority. It is now sufficient to have applied for 
such approval. (www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/15589.pdf 
 
Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs): A mix between conventional limited liability 
corporations and partnerships, LLPs are regarded as ‘the best of both worlds’ by 
accountants and business lawyers, in particular: They combine limited liability with the 
tax advantages and the lower disclosure requirements of partnerships. A conventional 
limited liability corporation is ‘double-taxed’: The company pays corporate tax, and 
the shareholders pay tax on their dividends. In partnerships, the partners’ shares of 
earnings are taxed, but the partnership itself is not taxed. LLPs extend limited liability 
to the limited partners (the equivalent of shareholder-owners) and avoid double 
taxation.  
 
Limited Liability Companies (LLC): In the US, these companies are a hybrid 
between fully quoted limited liability corporations and LLPs. Differently from LLPs, 
there is no ceiling on the number of limited partners/shareholders, and they are allowed 
to be active in the management of the company. This means that business owners 
can avoid corporate taxation while fully enjoying the advantages of limited 
liability. 
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Reforms for restoring freedom and equality 
 
So, what can be done in the face of such blatant and deeply engrained special interest 
protection? We agree with a growing number of observers in the field (see box 3) that 
campaigns and appeals to the conscience of the ‘corporate person’ and to self-governed 
‘corporate social responsibility’ are not working. They have had their day, and they have 
been largely ineffective. Recent legal and political moves to make ‘good corporate 
governance’ more legally binding (e.g. the UK Companies Act 2006, the OECD guidelines 
and the EU parliamentary resolution mentioned above) are very welcome, but it remains to 
be seen whether they will provide protection for those who are harmed by corporate 
behaviour. In our view, reforms that deserve the name are reforms that tackle the causes of 
a problem: Limited liability is not the only, but a very major cause of the Tyranny of the 
Unaccountable Few. We conclude this contribution with a discussion of the options. It is 
clear that we are at the beginning of a new debate on the importance of reforming limited 
liability and that it is only as more research and debate is conducted into the areas we have 
highlighted from the historical record and from the present century that the social 
momentum of reform will gather strength and focus. 
 
Abolish limited liability altogether 
 
This is the position of the starkest defenders of free markets, the libertarians. In For a New 
Liberty: The Liberitarian Manifesto, Murray N Rothbard – perhaps the most eminent of 
Liberitarians, Friedrich von Hayek apart – approvingly quotes Robert Poole, a fellow-
libertarian and contemporary US intellectual entrepreneur: "A libertarian society would 
be a full-liability society where everyone is fully responsible for his actions and any 
harmful consequences they might cause." (ch. 13) This puts an unambiguous finger on 
the sorest point of limited liability for corporations: A free market society cannot 
tolerate unequal protection. In particular, it cannot do so without total loss of face 
and legitimacy if, at the same time, free markets – or the God of the Invisible Hand - 
are being held up as the saviour of all mankind. Either we have free markets or we 
have giant corporations without responsibilities. The present sort of corporate 
“freedom” is the freedom of the uncontrolled child, all of whose needs must be met 
without any reciprocal responsibility. 
 
Were there no limited liability in the cases we have cited in this study, there would 
have been a great incentive on shareholders and directors to avoid the 
circumstances that created the trouble. Thus, the incentives driving Enron would 
have been very different. While where damage and company failure did result then 
creditors and those suffering damages would have their day in court with the 
owners.  The major shareholders of Farepak and its parent companies would have 
had to deliver the Christmas hampers as advertised. Scrooge would perforce have a 
change of heart.  The grinch would not have stolen Christmas. 
 
Therefore, in our view, limited liability as it stands must go, without any doubt. It 
does not follow, though, that the proposal of replacing limited liability with full 
liability for everyone restores the equality of all before the law. It does not do so, so 
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long as there aren’t equal opportunities for everyone. Liberitarians assume this is the 
case. We know, it is not. Mr or Ms Tom, Dick or Jones, having observed 
government recommendations to take responsibility for their old age rather than to 
rely on a state pension by joining a private pension fund, are not in the same boat as 
Mr Salomon or Lord Conrad Black. Nor are the unsecured creditors of Farepak – 
those paying in their meagre savings in good faith – in the same boat as the Farepak 
managing and executive directors, who turned out to be the unsecured creditors of 
EHR.  
 
When the London City crashed in the wake of the UK Companies Act 1862 and the 
proliferation of limited liability companies, Punch (2 October 1867, quoted in Taylor 
(2006, ch.5) exclaimed: 
 
“Let us have no ex post facto laws, but let it be understood that the 
Directors of the next Assurance Company that collapses shall be hanged. 
The process can do no harm, and may do much good.” (2 October 1867) 
 
Gratifying as this outlook may be for the victims of limited liability, it is not 
constructive: The point is not to threaten all those who engage in business activities 
with possible ruin (let alone death by hanging) when things go wrong. Not only 
would this discourage innovation and entrepreneurship that is indispensable to 
progress. It would also subject those small and powerless shareholder-owners that 
find themselves in pension funds because of misleading and badly designed 
government policies to the same discipline as those with unfettered powers to 
themselves bring destruction onto others. The objective should not and cannot be 
to deter the daring or to punish the powerless in equal measure with the tyrants. 
The objective is to restore the basic principle of any free society, namely the equality 
of all before the law and to encourage the constructive dynamism this will bring for 
innovation, economic prosperity and progress. This does require the abolition of any 
limitations for those in control of their actions on their liability for damages towards 
others. In this sense, limited liability, as it stands, must go. 
 
The California model – pro rata liability 
 
One way out of the conundrum of how to balance reasonable protection from 
unforeseeable complexities (as opposed to designed fraud) with equality of all before 
the law is to replace the current system with a pro-rata liability system, operated in 
California until 1931. Pro-rata liability means that in addition to risking their 
investment, shareholders are responsible for the debts of the company in proportion 
to the amount of the company they own. Own one per cent of the shares and be 
responsible for one per cent of the debt. As an extension of the same idea, the 
system operated by the US banking sector of double or triple liability would follow 
the same logic: Make the liability proportional (by one, two or three times) to the 
investment. ‘Sue the shareholders’ may look good on a protest banner. But to be 
effective, a campaign to restore equal freedoms to the economic market needs to 
pay attention to detail, and to have some practical intermediate stages.  
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The balance of rights and the socialisation of risk 
 
In more general terms a clear understanding of the special status enjoyed by 
shareholders should make it easier to argue for balancing rights for community 
groups, elected governments and trade unions. Limited liability, as it stands, is an 
affront to the equality of all before the law, a feudal privilege of shareholder-owners. 
As the report for Synapse Energy Economics, quoted above, shows very clearly, limited 
liability serves only one purpose: To shift the cost of taking risks from those earning the 
profits, when things go well, to society, when things go wrong. As seen, not only does this 
violate the basic legal foundations of a free society, it also encourages reckless free-riding 
and corrupt behaviour by the few at the expense of the many.  
 
There are two basic solutions to rectify this open invitation to abuse: First, balance the 
special protection extended to shareholder-owners by the special protection for other 
interest groups, such as trade unions, elected governments, and consumer organisations. 
Second, socialise risk, not by using the ‘corporate veil’ to secretly shift it from profiteers to 
taxpayers, but by using democratically established collective institutions to assess which risks 
society wants to take at what price, and which risks it doesn’t want to take at all. Put 
differently, replace limited liability with an insurance system with clear and socially agreed 
upon criteria for the appropriate insurance of particular investment risks on the basis of 
scientific and societal debate and discussion. When TeGenero was found to have only a £2 
million insurance for the TN1412 trial, no-one disagreed that this was pitiful. There were 
rules and guidelines on what constituted a reasonable insurance sum for this kind of trial, 
based on experience, country-and sector-specific factors and scientific knowledge. Any free 
society that takes the principle of equality before the law seriously, has the means and 
possibilities to pay for a national insurance system that assesses risk from the point of view 
of all concerned and offers those willing to take the risk in order to make profits a 
reasonable insurance deal to go ahead. Taxpayers will prefer to pay up for this societal 
assessment exercise and to abolish the current system of limited liability: That which leaves 
risk assessment to those with no responsibilities for the consequences, and shifts the often 
extremely high costs of risks gone wrong from the Unaccountable Few to the nameless 
taxpayer without any kind of democratic control.  
 
Developing debate and research 
 
In addition to these basic reform outlines, debate and research on limited liability raises a 
number of specific issues for further consideration and discussion: 
 
There are many opportunities to explore the use of the limited liability debate in respect of 
attempts at privatisation. For example, opponents of privatisation may wish to insist that any 
new company accept the same liability as the previous community or state owned 
enterprise. For example, those injured by malpractice in a hospital may wish to retain the 
right to compensation they have with the National Health Service but would lose in any case 
similar to Tegenero. 
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The ability of capital to move across borders may create a fear of capital flight from attempts 
to raise the problem of limited liability in a single country. As seen, for example, the early 
spread of limited liability in the US in the 19th century was largely down to competition 
between states to attract investment, and a subsequent ‘race to the bottom’. However, in 
this era of instant global communications such blackmail can be avoided, and a ‘race to the 
bottom’ replaced with a ‘climb to the top’, by parallel and inter-related debates in many 
communities and economic sectors and at the inter and supra national institutions. 
Discussions of the problem of limited liability might be usefully conducted more or less 
simultaneously at national level, at the level of the European Union, US federal institutions, 
the Word Trade Organisation, the UN Economic and Social Council and within emerging 
major economies of East and South Asia. It is worth noting that until 1931 California 
apparently required corporations with limited liability in other U.S. states to forgo this 
privilege when operating in the sunshine state.  
 
Without limited liability, as it stands today, many of the guidelines for ‘good corporate 
governance’ – such as those recently recommended by the OECD and the EU parliament, 
amongst many other international organisations and institutions, and incorporated into the 
UK Companies Act 2006 -, would not be mere appeals to the goodwill of companies to 
abite by them, but could instead become legal standards. To quote but one of these 
guidelines, the OECD (2001) recommends that governments should consider taking action 
to: 
 
• Require up front disclosure of beneficial ownership and control information to the 
authorities upon the formation of the corporate vehicle; 
• Oblige intermediaries involved in the formation and management of corporate vehicles 
(such as company formation agents, trust companies, lawyers, trustees, and other 
professionals) to maintain such information; 
• Develop the appropriate law enforcement infrastructure to enable them to launch 
investigations into beneficial ownership and control when illicit activity is suspected. 
 
If limited liability were abolished and replaced by an appropriate insurance system to assess 
social risks and to provide reasonable insurance deals for companies, such guidelines would 
be unnecessary. Their contents would be law, and many of the disasters companies have 
visited on powerless stakeholders in the past, would not happen. Further research will be 
needed into appropriate consultative and legal processes regarding the legal structure where 
a person or corporate person should be held accountable. 
 
The privilege of limited liability also provides a material rather than a moral argument for 
progressive individual and corporate taxation. That is to say, wealth that has been 
accumulated by overriding other people’s property and employment rights gives society a 
general right of compensation from the profits. In the most general sense such taxation 
provides society at large with the insurance fund to pick up the pieces of corporate damage. 
 
“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. Lord Acton 
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